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M i c h e l e R i v k i n - F i s hConceptualizing Feminist Strategies for Russian
Reproductive Politics: Abortion, Surrogate Motherhood,
and Family Support after Socialismhe question ofwhether and how feminist concepts and paradigms devel-
oped in Western, liberal contexts may be relevant for struggles for gen-T der equality in former socialist states has been a central point of debate
between and among feminists West and East since the late 1980s.1 In one
of the most thought-provoking and important statements on this issue,
Nanette Funk (2004) cautioned that US feminist critiques of Anglo-
American liberalism cannot be readily exported to make sense of liberal cam-
paigns in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Funk
characterizes this critique of Anglo-American liberalism as having five key di-
mensions: first, that liberalism endows rights and goods to individuals, rather
than recognizing nonindividual goods and rights, and fails to recognize that
individuals may perceive themselves as having duties to broader collectives;
second, that liberalism endorses a neutral vision of the state rather than rec-
ognizing that the state inevitably conveys political goals and visions; third,
that liberalism’s value of independence does not adequately recognize human
dependency; fourth, that liberalism imagines persons as disembodied, ne-
glecting the ways bodies are gendered, raced, classed; and finally, that liberal-
ism’s distinction between public and private spheres obscures the gendered
power ofmen in both public and private, and fails to acknowledge howwom-
en’s subordination is ensured by their relegation to the private sphere (2004,
704).
Funk then proceeds to survey the historically expansive philosophical
landscape of liberal thought throughout Eastern Europe and Russia, dem-
onstrating how this complex body of social and political theory has sub-I express heartfelt thanks to Maxine Eichner, Beth Holmgren, Julie Hemment, Janet
Johnson,Nadia Kizenko, AndreaMazzarino, Ziggy Rivkin-Fish, and Tatiana Zhurzhenko for
their helpful feedback on earlier drafts. Special appreciation goes to Nadia Kizenko, Elena
Gapova, and Kari Points for providing invaluable insights and resources. I am deeply indebted
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1 See Funk and Mueller (1993), Holmgren (1995), Snitow (1999), Gal and Kligman
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570 y Rivkin-Fishstantially differed from American formations of liberalism. The region’s
liberals, for example, have always recognized collective goods and rights;
they have endorsed a conception of the state as having a religious andmoral
mission, not remaining neutral in relation to citizens’ own understandings
of the good life. They have not assumed a disembodied autonomous actor
but have promoted the need for sacrifice and duty—especially gendered
forms of duty to the family and nation—as taking precedence over indi-
vidual rights. Moreover, Eastern and Central European liberals have placed
extensive emphasis on dependency, particularly of individuals on the state,
and made little effort to cultivate individual independence in either an
economic or political sense; there has been minimal attention to the need
for a private sphere protected from state influence. Central to these ideas,
Funk explains, is that the region’s multiple liberalisms have endorsed rela-
tional forms of personhood, which she problematizes as giving rise to
norms of gendered duties and sacrifice for the collective good—and result-
ing in women’s subordination.
Given these historically specific forms of liberalism, she cautions, con-
temporary feminist critiques of American liberalismwill likelymiss themark
in capturing the particular forms of gendered domination in Eastern and
Central Europe. Indeed, Funk posits that feminist critiques of American
society’s prized notions of autonomous individualism and the insulated
private sphere are not appropriate paradigms on which to base struggles
for gender equality in that region, because these specific components of
liberalism have not been widely embraced there. Nor can critiques of neo-
liberalism effectively be phrased in terms of “revaluing dependency” (Funk
2004, 708), an approach central to the feminist defense of social welfare
programs in the United States.2 Funk argues that feminists should support
contemporary local struggles that endorse individual rights and a renewed
private sphere, and that eschew citizens’ dependency on the state, as ameans
of recognizing the specific histories and contemporary problematics against
which local progressives and feminists are struggling.
This article takes up the challenges Funk poses to explore the possible
contours of feminist intervention in the realm of Russian reproductive
politics—specifically, abortion access, surrogate motherhood, and family
support. Inspired and challenged by Funk’s concerns, I examine whether
and how endorsing women’s autonomy and a private spheremay be impor-
tant for promoting Russian women’s interests in reproductive politics; I2 It is important to note that US feminists, too, are careful to distinguish between “depen-
dence that is rooted in unjust . . . social institutions” and “socially necessary dependency,” such
as that inherent in the human life course (Fraser and Gordon 1994, 24).
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inist perspectives among Russian stakeholders. Additionally, I address
the complex issue of conceptualizing a feminist politics of social welfare
in this formerly socialist, neoliberal, and nationalist policy context. In
analyzing each reproductive issue, I examine its historical and legal con-
figurations and offer a feminist analysis of the ways these configurations
contribute to gendered inequities. Further, I highlight the local sym-
bolic formations and political interests that shape the ways each issue has
(or has not) been construed as a gendered problem of broader public
concern in Russian society. Strategizing about how to address the gaps be-
tween feminist political perspectives and local knowledge formations is a
major concern among feminist anthropologists (Hemment 2007; Boro-
voy and Ghodsee 2012). In reflecting on feminist strategies for Russian
reproductive politics that may bridge those divides, I attend to the poten-
tial concerns that feminists may have while maintaining a pragmatic stance
about the need for culturally informed engagement to promote gender
equality.
Methodologically, this article draws on a range of sources and data that
vary for each of the three issues I examine. My overarching argument about
the challenges of conceptualizing feminist strategies in Russia builds on
nineteen years of anthropological engagement with Russia’s reproductive
politics, including fifteen months of participant-observation fieldwork and
long-term key informant relationships that extend from 1994 to the pres-
ent through visits, phone and Skype calls, and e-mail correspondence. My
analysis of the policy dimensions, social movements, and broader discur-
sive formations of abortion and family support are based on extensive anal-
ysis of Russian-language media, demographic analyses of fertility trends
and politics, and sociological texts on the family, from the late 1960s
through the present. Unlike those issues, which have a long history of po-
liticization, surrogacy is a post-Soviet phenomenon that is just beginning
to be publicly debated. My analysis offers a preliminary mapping of the
emerging terrain of Russian surrogacy politics, drawing on four sources:
Russia’s surrogacy legislation, a website in which would-be surrogates ad-
vertise themselves and women seeking to hire surrogates post narratives
of their experiences, a Russian Orthodox Church website with critiques
and debates on surrogacy, and secondary literature analyzing Russia’s sur-
rogacy policies. The online discussion board provides a unique, if prelimi-
nary glimpse into the ways legal and commercial structures set women
against each other in a microlevel conflict of interests; although I cannot
establish whether the postings I analyze are representative of Russian
surrogate relationships in general, my analysis reveals what is culturally pos-
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and commissioning mothers. The politics of surrogacy at both micro-
and macrolevels reveal conceptual challenges for feminist strategizing
that are quite distinct from those at stake in abortion and family support
politics, where the state is a dominant regulatory presence. In the neolib-
eral, marketized context of surrogacy, women’s inequality is structured on
the basis of both infertility and poverty, through competition with other
women, and the church, rather than the state, is asserting its political voice
for reform.
The article illuminates three pressing questions: First, how might no-
tions of individual autonomy and a private sphere enable a reshaping of
the particular kinds of subordination that have emerged historically and
that presently configure Russian women’s status on particular reproduc-
tive issues? Second, to what extent would notions of individual auton-
omy and a private sphere be culturally salient, able to resonate locally with
existing values and thereby feasible for mobilizing progressive change on
reproductive issues? Third, if a revaluation of the concept of dependency
is not a viable feminist strategy in a context where decades of centralized
state power produced a crippling socioeconomic, gendered dependency,
how do we conceptualize a feminist politics of social welfare? The article
argues that a feminist stance must maintain critical attention to the histor-
ical forms of domination produced by both the centralized state/economy
during socialism and the neoliberal state/economy of the past two decades.
Such formations may selectively draw on liberal feminist ideals such as indi-
vidual autonomy and privacy while combining them with attention to the
value of care work as a matter of justice (Tronto 1993; Fraser and Gordon
1994; Eichner 2010). Much work remains to be done in articulating, clar-
ifying, and achieving these hybrid visions.The politics of abortion and contraception
In 1920, the Soviet Union became the first country in the world to legalize
abortion. Policy makers considered abortion access necessary for emanci-
pating women from the home and mobilizing them into the labor force.
Yet they did not condone the limitation of births, and neither promoted
contraceptives nor ensured their availability. In 1936 Josef Stalin recrimi-
nalized abortion as part of his drive to increase the birthrate; this resulted
in grim surges of maternal mortality as women sought illegal and unsafe
abortions en masse. In 1955, Nikita Khrushchev legalized the proce-
dure in order to prevent these deaths. Yet Soviet leaders and physicians
denounced abortion as both dangerous and immoral, an antisocial act re-
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existed despite the fact that the Soviet government made very little effort
to produce or import contraceptives and did not endorse the prevention of
unwanted pregnancy. In fact, the state was actively pronatalist and urged
women to give birth. Considering abortion an undesirable social practice,
state officials gave no thought to women’s comfort during the procedure.
Inmany cases, women endured abortions in large wards without privacy, in
clinics they described as factories or meat grinders (miasorubki), and even
without anesthesia. Some doctors spoke of women as needing to suffer or
feel guilty about abortions as punishment for their refusal of motherhood
(Rivkin-Fish 1994).
After the Soviet collapse, many branded abortion a sign of the delegit-
imized past that should be eliminated. Progressives and conservatives ap-
proached this process in dramatically different ways. Progressives founded
family planning clinics, working withWestern aid agencies and pharmaceu-
tical firms to promote contraceptives instead of abortion as a mainmeans of
fertility control. Significantly, Russia’s abortion rate has steadily declined
from 100 per 1,000 women of reproductive age in 1991, to 55 in 2000,
and to 44.1 in 2005 (Sakevich 2007). This occurred despite the fact that
in the late 1980s the Ministry of Health expanded the criteria through
which women could access abortion in the second trimester to include
circumstances related to poverty and social marginalization. In expand-
ing these so-called social criteria for abortion, the state implicitly recog-
nized that women’s use of abortion occurred in conditions of dire neces-
sity, including abject poverty, unemployment, sickness, disability, and a
husband’s death or incarceration.
Conservatives took a very different approach to combatting abortion.
From the beginning of the 1990s, Russian nationalists seized on abortion
and contraceptives as insidious practices contributing to the nation’s low
fertility and rapidly decreasing population (Rivkin-Fish 2006). Alarmed at
what they termed Russia’s demographic catastrophe, they portrayed con-
traception as a cynical Western ruse to further Russia’s population decline
by convincing women to refuse childbearing (Mikhalych 1997; Novaia
Gazeta 1999). Supporters of this nationalist demographic politics have
thus construed abortion and contraception as issues of national security
practices linked to the country’s weakened geopolitical power. They por-
tray the criminalization of abortion as a means of increasing fertility and
strengthening Russia geopolitically, socially, and spiritually. Their unre-
lenting campaigns and legislative proposals to restrict or criminalize abor-
tion have borne steady results: in 2003 and again in 2007 the Ministry
of Health, without soliciting public debate, reduced the criteria through
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2003, Timashova 2003; Papyrin 2007). This shift is curious, given that
second-trimester abortions are continually declining and now constitute
a tiny proportion of all abortions. In 2000, 43,687 second-trimester “social
abortions” were recorded in Ministry of Health clinics; these comprised
2.57 percent of the total number of abortions undertaken in these clinics.
By 2010, this number had declined to 392, or 0.05 percent of all abortions
in these clinics (Sakevich 2012).
In June 2011, Parliamentarian V. G. Draganov introduced draft legisla-
tion requiring women to get written permission from their husbands, and
minors to get written permission from a parent or guardian, to obtain abor-
tions; a waiting period of seven days to receive an abortion (except in the
eleventh week of gestation, in which case the waiting period would be re-
duced to forty-eight hours); a mandatory ultrasound in which a woman
was to see and hear the fetus’s beating heart; and a counseling session in-
forming women about the harms of abortion and her “right to refuse” an
abortion (the ultrasound and counseling were described as part of the in-
formed consent process). The bill also proposed eliminating all social crite-
ria for second-trimester abortion except when a pregnancy resulted from
rape (Draganov 2011). At the time of this writing, these requirements
have not all passed; in February 2012, the Russian Ministry of Health
agreed to restrict second-trimester abortion except in cases where the preg-
nancy resulted from rape (Putin 2012). Yet with ongoing support from the
Orthodox Church and global antiabortion movements, further restrictions
may emerge, making the question of effective feminist strategies for ensur-
ing abortion access urgent.Conceptualizing feminist strategies
Draganov’s bill generated the most vibrant public debate yet on abortion
politics, arousing the opposition of liberal commentators and even some
street protests. Bloggers initiated an online petition opposing it. Interest-
ingly, one of the main ways these advocates defended abortion access
was by asserting the need to “fight abortion, not women.” In one of the
very first public demonstrations ever, protestors held signs reading, “We
are against abortion” and “A child must be wanted”—implicit refer-
ences to the legitimacy of contraceptives.3 St Petersburg sociologist Olga
Brednikova cogently argued for reframing the issue from one of solving
the “problem of abortion” to one of asking, “how to ease the burden of3 See http://gaidarfund.ru/projects.php?chapter=project_club_discuss&id=60.
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jects.4
Brednikova’s call to reintroduce women’s voices to the debate suggests
that Funk’s calls for feminist struggles oriented toward women’s rights
and individual autonomy, and against calls for sacrifice in the name of the
nation, seem readily applicable to Russia’s abortion politics. Funk’s argu-
ment that gender equality would be enhanced by developing “a feminist
conception of the public/private distinction” (2004, 713) to protect women
from an intrusive state also makes sense. Such developments may be in the
incipient stages. When, in April 2011, abortion opponents drafted a bill to
end public financing of abortion, several women Duma members rejected it
on the basis that “women have the right to decide independently about their
own fate” (Regions.ru 2011). It is notable that neither the deputies nor any
other proponents of legally accessible, publicly funded abortion have de-
ployed the concept of choice, inasmuch as Russian women have widely expe-
rienced abortion as a symptom of their lack of choices, both to prevent
pregnancy and to raise their desired number of children. Moreover, women
Dumamembers and social activists who opposed the bill highlighted how ex-
tensive poverty impedes women from deciding to bear more children, rather
than emphasizing the principle of individual autonomy. Several emphasized
the likelihood that unsafe abortions, rather than a higher fertility rate, would
result from financial or legal restrictions on the procedure.
Rhetorical references to poverty as a cause for protecting abortion access
should raise feminist concerns: the failure to recognize women’s right to
autonomy leaves open the possibility that methods such as means-testing
could determine a woman’s abortion access, or that social welfare provi-
sions could be offered to pregnant women, fetuses, and babies in lieu of
abortion rights. Certainly, the idea that women have the right to autono-
mous decisions about their bodies exists in Russia, and this implies the ne-
cessity of a private sphere outside of state control. Yet the predominant focus
on socioeconomic constraints to childbearing may also reflect a cultural
skepticism about the practical significance of legal rights in contemporary
Russia (Turbine 2007), where juridical protections have been notoriously
weak. This ambivalence about rights as meaningful personal protections also
cuts the other way, as some feminist commentators have evaluated the sig-
nificance of proposed restrictions on abortion from the perspective of
women’s practical possibilities for subverting the law rather than as a matter4 This quotation appeared on the Gaidar Fund’s website in 2011 but has since been re-
moved.
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marked, “It would seem that the [proposed] law should generate great
protest, because it’s unlikely that Russian women will give up their long-
standing rights. My cautious hypothesis is that people are not as much in-
terested in the law, as in the ways they will be able to find to get around
the barriers. . . . Long experiences of daily practice reveal that people are
able to adapt, and go around the law. In general, the middle class will suf-
fer less, inasmuch as they undergo far fewer abortions and when they do,
they get them in private clinics” (Roundtable 2011, 11).
Even if feminists did pursue legal guarantees for abortion rights, liberal
notions of individual autonomy and a private spheremay not be judged suf-
ficient moral foundations for preserving these rights in the face of increas-
ingly prevalent arguments by church authorities that abortion constitutes
the “murder” of a “child.”Ubiquitous anxieties over Russia’s demographic
crisis further constrain the rhetorical possibilities for feminist interventions.
For example, soon after reproductive health advocates established the
Russian Family Planning Association in 1993, the Orthodox Church and
others concerned with reversing low and declining fertility lobbied the
Duma vigorously against supporting family planning. Politicians rescinded
state funding for contraceptives as a matter of promoting national interests
in increasing the birthrate (Babasyan 1999). The state’s continued willing-
ness to imprint its demographic interests onto women’s bodies suggests
that promoting the value of a private sphere is both important and fraught
with dangers for feminists. Feminist arguments that women have the right
to make autonomous decisions about their reproductive lives need to be
carefully constructed to avoid being taken as evidence that feminism is hos-
tile to children and inimical to the nation’s demographic vitality. For while
it is mainly extreme nationalists and Orthodox Church adherents who re-
ject contraceptives, the notion that contraceptive use in and of itself lowers
the birthrate is very widespread (Ekho Moskvy 2010). Feminists would do
well to explain that women have been controlling their fertility in Russia for
decades but have had limited means for doing so safely. It is imperative to
reframe contraceptives as enhancing women’s health and fertility by reduc-
ing both the abortion rate and cases of secondary sterility that result from
poor quality or underground abortions. For poststructuralist critics, this
kind of rhetoric may appear problematically complicit with essentialist
views of women as naturally desiring to bear children. Yet promoting5 Although some protests against abortion restrictions have recently occurred, it does
not seem that feminists are conceptualizing a mass strategy of collective action to ensure
legal abortion rights.
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will serve to legitimize feminism as a social force for positive change. In-
cipient Russian framings of contraceptive services as societal investments
in the protection of women’s health, the prevention of abortion, and
the promotion of timely pregnancies are the most promising way to
promote women’s reproductive autonomy in this hostile, nationalist
context.Surrogate motherhood: Commercializing women’s interrelations
If the state’s demographic concerns align with theOrthodoxChurch’s goal
to restrict abortion, these institutions differ in their position on surrogate
motherhood. Presently, Russia’s juridical treatment of surrogate mother-
hood creates broad opportunities for the practice, explicitly permitting
commercial surrogacy. Order 67 of the Ministry for Health specifies that
married couples or single women may use a surrogate when the commis-
sioning woman is biologically unable to conceive or carry a pregnancy to
term. Surrogate mothers must have at least one healthy child of their own,
demonstrate that they are mentally and physically healthy, and be between
twenty and thirty-five years old. They can be married or single and may or
may not donate their own gametes.6 The surrogate can receive compensa-
tion for her services and expenses connected with the pregnancy and birth.
However, the law does not establish guidelines for how such fees should be
determined and states that a written contract specifying the terms of the
agreement is not mandatory. Interestingly, it recognizes contracts that are
created only with regard to enforcing the commissioning parties’ financial
responsibilities to the surrogate, not for determining custody of the child in
the case of disputes. Surrogate mothers maintain all rights to the child re-
gardless of the terms of a written contract (Points 2009; Svitnev n.d.).
The legislation’s ethical concerns include ensuring the voluntary charac-
ter of participation through written informed consent; recognizing and
privileging the gestational surrogate’s infant bond, even without a genetic
relationship; and preventing surrogates’ exploitation by allowing payment,
providing no restrictions on the amount of payment, and viewing any fi-
nancial contracts that establish commissioning parties’ financial responsi-
bility to surrogates as binding. Analyzing comparative legislation on surro-
gacy, Kari Points (2009) observes that Russia stands out in its minimal
scope of regulations and lack of sanctions for the transgression of existing
requirements (35). Nor have Russian officials welcomed public debate in6 Further, the legislation requires written informed consent from all parties.
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where women’s groups, bioethicists, politicians, and industry leaders have
pressed their interests (34).
Opposing the state and surrogate advocates, in 2011 Russia’s Orthodox
Church began avidly condemning surrogate motherhood as a new form of
prostitution. Prompted by its increasing commonality in society (including
the case of a high-profile rock celebrity, Fillip Kirkorov, who hired anAmer-
ican surrogate to bear him a child), Archpriest Dimitrii Smirnov insisted
that surrogacy dehumanizes people, treating them as “machines” (Smirnov
2011) or “farms” for growing people; he highlighted how surrogacy en-
ables the rich to exploit the poor (Smirnov 2012). Deacon Andrej Kuraev
affirmed the ethical impermissibility of “alienating people from their bod-
ies” (Poedinik 2012). These analogies reflect Russia’s cultural framing of
surrogacy as an economic exchange, which sharply differs from US fram-
ings as a “gift of life,” compensated by financial “gifts” rather than pay-
ments or fees (Ragoné 1994, 32). Largely bypassing the issue of surro-
gates’ exploitation, supporters of surrogacy have claimed that “everyone
has the right to be a parent” (Poedinik 2012).
The complex political dynamics at stake for women on both sides of the
surrogacy relationship are evident in their Web postings on Surrogacy.ru.7
In the following section, I examine postings by commissioning women,
who articulate a deep sense of vulnerability in an unregulated commercial
surrogacy market. I then explore two postings by women offering their ser-
vices as surrogates, analyzing how they position their interests and aim to
protect themselves from exploitation. While it is difficult to say whether the
examples on this website are representative of most Russian surrogacy ne-
gotiations, they do provide insights into the discursive framings through
which women—as both commissioning mothers and surrogates—find it
possible to express their interests and attempt to manage competition with
others. In examining these discourses and the political contours of surro-
gacy in this unregulated context, I aim to illuminate the multiple forms of
gender inequity at stake and explore whether liberal concerns for autonomy
and a private sphere may be valuable, or how they may be limited, for de-
vising feminist strategies.
A central topic commissioning women address is reflected in the online
heading “How to Identify a Fraud? Your Experiences.” These narratives
provide details of long-suffering infertile women being swindled by manip-
ulative women seeking personal gain. One posting reads:7 These postings were available publicly on the website in January and February 2010.
Since the authors posted on an unrestricted site, I have treated them as available for analysis.
Since then, however, access to the chat room became restricted to those who register.
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My husband hasn’t left me (and for that, an enormous thank you to
him). We decided to use the services of a surrogate mother and ran
into a host of problems beyond nightmares. They cheat, come to you
already pregnant, etc. They all have unimaginable fees: a one room
apartment in Petersburg, $40–60,000. The surrogate mothers’ logic
is understandable—“I’m giving birth to a baby for you, giving it to
you, so put me in luxury.” We can’t afford this kind of sum. For that
reason I’m addressing the applicants: DON’T CREATE ARTIFICIAL DE-
MAND. Two years ago the services costs $5,000. Have prices risen
in these two years 10–15 times? Please share your experiences so we
can figure out this problem.
From a feminist perspective concerned with preventing the exploitation
of poor women, claims that “artificial demand” has unfairly raised the go-
ing rates for surrogates inspire little sympathy. Yet it bears noting that fem-
inists in states that treat the remuneration of surrogacy with caution as a po-
tential ethical violation of human rights and baby selling (e.g., Canada)
have maintained the need to clarify the concept of reasonable expenses
(Points 2009, 24, 26). The following posting provides further evidence
demonstrating that in an unregulated market without authoritative guide-
lines for the ethical treatment of surrogates, commissioning couplesmay ig-
nore the question of fair compensation. Yet this narrative also highlights
some of the particular vulnerabilities that commissioning women face:
I can conceive a child, but in no way carry it. In the past 15 years of
marriage I had 20 hopes, and 20 failures. . . . The last hope is a Sur-
rogate Mother. My husband and I began the search. Just as many of
you here, we wanted (I wanted) to spend as little money as possible.
To find a SM in the Moscow area and in Moscow itself is very expen-
sive. . . . To find a SM here or to send for one from the former Soviet
republics and rent her an apartment turns out to be almost the same
price. But I tried to save—we had themoney, but as anyonemanaging
their household budget, I didn’t want to spend more than I had to!
But it turned out that I lost EVERYTHING! We found a girl from the
countryside of a brotherly republic who agreed to our conditions. She
came to the capital, we gave her a room in our decent size apartment.
The most common, disheveled country girl turned out to be very
crafty and capable . . . and quickly learned to look decent. Further-
more, she really liked the life of the capital. I can say that women from
there are not like our, Russian [women]. [Slur] Ukrainians [khokhlush-
ki] as a rule are persistent, smart, and sly. I didn’t immediately begin to
suspect that something was not okay, at first I was happy that my hus-
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chocolates or something else tasty, for the FAMILY dinner. But nature
has created us to sense deception immediately. I began to notice a lot
of intriguing and unpleasant things. But that’s about my suffering!
We succeeded in getting pregnant the third time and I kept my SM
home with me until 12 weeks under my complete control. Then I
found her a little apartment not too far away and rented it. She happily
moved out from our place, I breathed a sigh of relief. But happiness
didn’t return to our home. My husband began to always be delayed at
work. And once I caught him with our SM. Very simple, he didn’t an-
swer his cell and at work they told me that he left in the very beginning
of the morning. I sensed it with my heart . . . and my suspicions were
entirely justified. I became hysterical . . . but my husband, the closest
person to me, told me that I was only half a woman, and he needed a
healthy broad, who could bear him healthy children all on her own.
That’s what happened! I am already 41 years old, I have no husband,
I have no child, I have nothing. . . . I can’t even adopt a baby because
now I am divorced. . . .Don’t repeat mymistake, don’t bring your SM
to live with you.
This commissioning woman’s explicit acknowledgment of her effort to
save money and maintain strict control over the surrogate reveals how un-
regulated commercial surrogacy poses threats to surrogate mothers’ au-
tonomy. The overt use of an ethnic slur and prejudice against the apparent
rural background of the surrogate, who has come to live under the surveil-
lance of the commissioning wife, further reveals the compounding layers
of inequality in this relationship, extending from class to ethnicity to regional
status.At the same time, this one-sidednarrative also enables recognition that
surrogates have agency and, in providing a desired service for the commis-
sioning couple, are not merely powerless servants. Nor are commissioning
women—despite their economic resources and employer status—situated in
a clear-cut dominant position over surrogates. In a cultural context that con-
structs womanhood through motherhood while stigmatizing adoption,
these women’s infertility leaves them extraordinarily vulnerable.8 It raises
the possibility of being defined as less than a real woman, a stigma that
women know may lead to abandonment and permanent childlessness.8 In 2002, approximately 700,000 children resided in state orphanages (Zabina et al.
2009, 162). Adoption is often kept secret, shrouded in assumptions that abandoned children
are tainted by poor genetics, gestation by HIV-positive or alcoholic mothers, and neglect in
state institutions. For the history of Russia’s changing cultural ideas about orphans, see Creu-
ziger (1997).
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terests and symbolic inequalities, it leaves the two sides to negotiate these
relationships themselves, opening the way for conflict and manipulation
rather than justice.
Some of the ways these negotiations take place are evident in postings
from women offering their services as surrogates. While these advertise-
ments are composed in stylized ways and therefore should not be read as
transparent evidence of reality, we can analyze them as performative effects
that are revealing in two important ways. First, in attempting to portray
themselves in the best possible light, would-be surrogates anticipate the is-
sues of concern to commissioning parents and assert the kinds of terms they
are willing to agree to. Second, some of these advertisements undertake
rhetorical attempts to justify the payment of “fair” remuneration. The strat-
egies surrogate mothers use to establish an arrangement on terms they find
agreeable shed light on the struggles that attend surrogacy arrangements
and the informal means through which negotiations take place.
One would-be surrogate addresses commissioning couples’ fears by giv-
ing extensive details about her health and genetic status. She then empha-
sizes her sincerity and flexibility in meeting their needs:
I can become a complete SM (the egg is yours + the sperm is yours) or
a partial (the egg is mine + sperm is yours). . . .My husband agrees to
this. I live in Saratov oblast’ and can temporarily move to your city. I
am even tempered, calm, responsible. You don’t have to worry, after
the birth I will give you the child. My 3 are enough for me. I need to
get them taken care of financially. . . . Before taking this step my hus-
band and I discussed it all, more than once. I can assure you that you
will not regret it. . . . I seek medical care + 9,000 rubles a month +
350,000 rubles. I will consider your offers. Write to me and tell me
what you want. I believe we can reach an agreement and help each
other. If it’s necessary, then a fictitious marriage is possible. Write me
at [e-mail].
This author portrays herself as poised to agree tomost any terms at all: to
be an egg donor or a gestational surrogate, to move to another city during
the pregnancy, to undertake a fictitious marriage. While naming a desired
sum, she claims a willingness to entertain other (presumably less lucrative)
offers. She portrays hermotivation as obtaining the financial wherewithal to
care for her existing three children, a goal that she depicts as compatible
with all the demands a commissioning couple may have. Although we can-
not take this limitless flexibility at face value, it nonetheless raises the trou-
bling specter of how desperation may lead to subservience. Viewed along-
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women, it is clear that the unregulated commercial surrogacy market has
failed to address women’s competing interests. The legislative focus on en-
suring surrogates’ rights to keep the baby should they choose to do so
seems to have defined the most pressing issue related to “women’s rights”
a priori, essentializing women’s subjectivity as mothers while ignoring
their interests as either workers or as potential victims of discrimination
and fraud. Another would-be surrogate, in contrast, clearly asserts her
self-interest while taking pains to establish the legitimacy of her financial
requirements:
I will help a well-off couple who can give themselves many things,
except the happiness of raising their own child. I will not become an
egg donor. With regard to payment, I want to immediately dispel
the myth about inexpensive surrogate mothers. In order to not of-
fend the feelings of those who have enormous desires and don’t
have financial resources, I will say that today only well-off people can
afford such procedures. For those who still haven’t been burned on
this problemandwhohaven’t encountered the situationwhenwomen
agree to one set of conditions of pay, but after conceiving extort
them, either for more money or an apartment, don’t forget that big
problems and headaches may be hidden under sweet responses and
low prices. You can’t expect a SM will make do with under 20,000
[international units/euros/dollars], it’s not worth it for her. . . . To-
day such services will cost a minimum of 2–3 times more. And as one
SM on the site rightly noted, everyone knows about the govern-
ment’s project to raise the birthrate in Russia, where the compensa-
tion is 250,000 rubles. Is there any reason now to speak of the reward
for a SM in the amount of $10,000, when any woman who gives
birth will not get much less?
And the most important issue is a person simply cannot be cheap!
And a personwhodecides to undertake this act, clearly understanding
all the seriousness of the operation and responsibility, and also the
consequences for themselves. . . . I have a clear understanding of the
seriousness of this act and with all responsibility will strive to answer
all questions. I will provide all the information you want. I will con-
sider any real offers [e-mail].
This author’s tactic of distinguishing herself from surrogates who extort
more money than initially agreed upon underscores the existence of a com-
petitive labormarket for surrogates.Withminimal regulation from the state
and an absence of professionals’ ethical frameworks, surrogacy involves
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they would any other commodity. Feminist interventions addressing the
ethical compromises emerging from women’s positioning in surrogacy—
particularly vis-à-vis each other—are clearly urgent.Conceptualizing feminist strategies
How useful are liberal concepts of individual autonomy and a private
sphere for promoting women’s interests in Russian surrogacy politics? In
Euro-American contexts, feminist proponents of surrogacy argue that
the ability to sell one’s eggs and contract for pregnancy services enhances
women’s autonomy in the marketplace, destabilizes the notion that women
are “naturally” nurturers (and that nurturing is antithetical to paid labor),
and thereby challenges the relegation of women to the private sphere (see
Berkhout 2008). Feminist critics, by contrast, raise concerns about the lim-
its of individual autonomy in a situation of severe inequality and women’s
limited opportunities for economic mobility. They argue that commercial
surrogacy objectifies women as tools for others’ goals in round-the-clock
labor lasting approximately forty weeks, with risks of morbidity and mortal-
ity. Moreover, the contracts limit a surrogate’s autonomy by prescribing the
medicalization of her body and restrictions on her daily activities: the good
of producing a healthy “product” requires subordinating the surrogates’
own needs and desires, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation and lack of
respect (Shanley 2001; Berkhout 2008; Ryan 2009).
As described above, Russia’s legal framing of surrogacy represents a neo-
liberal approach that enables the commodification of women’s bodies
without regard to the exploitation enabled bymarket relations. It illustrates
the dangers women face in an unregulated private sphere, and the limits of
contract theory for ensuring justice and equity for women in Russia. While
women’s open discussion of their economic interests suggests the basis for
transparent discussions about ethical approaches to surrogates’ compensa-
tion, ensuring a “fair” payment does not preclude themultiple forms of ob-
jectification and exploitation that surrogates experience. The perceived
need for commissioning parents to undertake surveillance of a surrogate’s
daily behaviors is something that surrogates themselves presume, as indi-
cated by their willingness tomove to commissioning parents’ city until after
the delivery. This willingness to cease, temporarily, to live with one’s own
children exposes the degree to which surrogates have internalized the need
to become an instrument for the commissioning couple; more research is
needed to understandwhether surrogates experience autonomy in these re-
lationships, and how.
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to address the multiple issues at stake in surrogacy (Shanley 2001). Prohib-
iting the process would drive it underground, making ethical debate and
professional guidelines impossible while increasing the likelihood of ex-
ploitation. Feminist interventions should address the vulnerabilities in-
curred by both groups of women in this unregulated market. Advocacy for
surrogates should involve arguing for the need to respect women’s labor
and bodily integrity; recognizing the risks involved in pregnancy, labor, and
delivery; and ensuring surrogates’ protection from bearing the long-term
costs these risks may generate. Advocacy for infertile women should require
destigmatizing infertility and childlessness and promoting the cultural ac-
ceptability of adoption. By struggling for more ethical approaches to surro-
gacy, and the welfare of abandoned children, feminists can also promote
their own cultural credibility, publicly demonstrating how enhancingwom-
en’s interests enhances the care of families and children.Fertility incentives and feminist approaches to family support
In 2007, after fifteen years of severe demographic panic focused largely on
declining fertility, Vladimir Putin established a program designed to stim-
ulate the birthrate. The state maternity capital program provides mothers
who give birth to a second or third child a voucher worth about $10,000
to help defray the costs of child rearing. Women can use their maternity
capital for housing and remodeling costs, the child’s education needs, or
their own pension savings. Putin justified this state investment—quite sub-
stantial in comparison with the previous fifteen years of meager state as-
sistance to families—as compensating for the “dependent and frankly even
degraded position within the family” that women suffer when they leave
the workforce to take care of children (Putin 2006). Notably, the state has
neither facilitated women’s ability to achieve a better work-life balance,
nor encouraged men to contribute to domestic labor, nor developed high-
quality childcare services. Instead, it has encouraged women to exit the
workforce as a solution to the presumed barriers impeding women from
bearing second and third children. Thus, despite Putin’s framing of this en-
titlement as promoting women’s needs, maternity capital ties the state’s
support for families closely to its own pronatalist goals, further entrenching
a vision of women as mothers and linking them to the domestic sphere.
Moreover, the idea that women can “choose” how to use their maternity
capital underscores the state’s cynical use of family support, by confronting
women with what may be the irreconcilable dilemma of addressing their
family’s needs (housing), their child’s needs (education), or their ownneeds
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families in Russia while prioritizing the demographic politics of increas-
ing childbearing.
In the section that follows, I examine the ways Russian observers have
conceptually coded maternity capital as a gendered concern, albeit not as
a matter of women’s domination. Recognizing Russian concerns over the
gendered politics of maternity capital is necessary for conceptualizing
meaningful and viable feminist strategies regarding family support. I then
place the topic in dialogue with Funk’s concerns around eschewing policies
that further entrench women’s dependency on the state—concerns echoed
by Russian feminist critics of maternity capital. While sympathetic to cri-
tiques of the maternity capital program, I caution against the full-scale re-
jection of state support for child rearing and dependent care, as is implied
by some Russian (neo)liberals, feminist or otherwise. I argue instead for a
feminist approach to family support that both expects the state to make it
economically possible for families to take care of their dependents and rec-
ognizes families’ rights to privacy in undertaking their caregiving duties in
ways that they deem appropriate.Russian responses to maternity capital
Prominent responses to maternity capital in Russia follow two logics
(Rivkin-Fish 2010). Many commentators, inspired by long-standing so-
cialist ideals that the state should bear some of the burden of raising
children, welcome it as a rightful entitlement. They lament that the sum
is inadequate to transform people’s quality of life, let alone encourage
more births. Others criticize the idea of pursuing increases in the birthrate
by targeting financial support to women, arguing that men’s role in the
family needs to be strengthened instead. A typical example of this perspec-
tive argues:
In Putin’s [statement] he spoke of the experiencewomenhave after giv-
ing birth of being dependent and degraded in the family. But there’s no
discussion of the permanent, humiliated position of men, who cannot
support their family with dignity on these miserly salaries. . . . That is,
men must refuse not only to have children, but also to get married and
have a family. Maternity capital may worsen this situation: men will be-
come completely unnecessary in the modern world—like, by the way,
the family . . . it is necessary to consider the role of men, their influence
on the demographic crisis. It’s completely evident that in order to con-
tinue the species, to completely reproduce the nation, a woman needs a
586 y Rivkin-Fishreliable rear guard: a husband, a provider, and defender from all finan-
cial storms and cataclysms. (Ekspert Sibir’ 2007)
This argument expresses widespread concerns that a long-standing cri-
sis of masculinity stands at the root of Russia’s family crisis, including low
fertility (Zdravomyslova and Temkina 2002; Zhurzhenko 2008). It dis-
places Anglo-American (white) feminist assumptions that men as a class
dominate women, highlighting local concerns that many men have suf-
fered systematic humiliation at the hands of both the Soviet state and the
contemporary market (Watson 1995; Kay 2006). It proposes that a key
aspect of women’s interests is the pressing need to reestablish men’s con-
nection to the family by affirming their cultural importance as breadwin-
ners and creating the economic conditions whereby men can financially
support their families.Conceptualizing feminist strategies
Russians’ critique of maternity capital as a resource for women taps into a
widespread contemporary logic that considers Soviet-era policies of wom-
en’s equality as having occurred at the expense of men’s emasculation and
estrangement from families. This logic calls for a renewed patriarchal order
and poses serious challenges for feminist strategizing on family support. Al-
though, as noted above, the maternity capital program does not enhance
women’s economic autonomywhile they are raising young children, it does
recognize that women are the ones who bear the burden, often including
the economic costs of child rearing. A state policy that gave fathers equal
access to state financial support for child rearing would likely leave women
further abandoned and impoverished. A key feminist challenge, conse-
quently, is finding a strategy that both protects women’s right to social
support for child rearing and advocates that the state and private businesses
facilitate men’s participation in family life and child rearing (without restor-
ing a patriarchal domestic order).
In acknowledging that most families confront economic hardship, the
maternity capital program also legitimizes the idea that the state should
help ameliorate these difficulties—a perspective that acknowledges the se-
vere hardship many women in Russian endure. The dismantling of social-
ism’s welfare entitlements, from free education and health care to full em-
ployment, has left women with virtually no social safety net. And while the
“free” market has enabled a small minority to become wealthy, employ-
ment protections have been severely eroded and many women face blatant
discrimination in the labor market. This structured gender inequality high-
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gations toward social welfare, an argument that needs to be carefully com-
bined with liberal concerns regarding the need to promote independent
civic action. Indeed, Russian feminists have criticized maternity capital on
the liberal grounds that it furthers women’s dependency on the state. Fem-
inist scholar Elena Gapova (2006) cautions that this program resembles the
Soviet treatment of women-mothers as passive recipients of state assistance;
Russian feminists Elena Zdravomyslova and Anna Temkina note how ma-
ternity capital subordinates women symbolically and hinders their mobility
in the labor force (Rotkirch, Temkina, and Zdravomyslova 2007).
Russian feminist critics thus echo Funk’s concerns about the need to
promote women’s independence from the state, in contrast to American
feminists Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon (1994), who have sought to
recast the concept of dependency in US public debate from being con-
sidered a sign of failure to being recognized as a central characteristic of
human life. Yet while Funk cautions against exporting this “revaluing [of]
dependency” to the former socialist context, where citizens’ ability to
enjoy independent social existence apart from the state has never been
widely endorsed or protected, she also—importantly—rejects a neoliberal
position denying the legitimacy of state benefits altogether (2004, 717).
She notes how historical forms of liberalism in the region were social dem-
ocratic, leaving open the possibility that liberal concerns for autonomy
and independence could simultaneously endorse state economic support,
what some have called social citizenship.
The debate over family support in Russia reveals that Funk has intro-
duced a series of challenging questions for feminists to further elaborate. It
demonstrates the important need to define terms such as “dependence”
and “independence” more carefully in devising feminist positions. In a
global context where neoliberal politics so often call for the withdrawal of
state welfare, feminists must devise strategies for preserving state obliga-
tions to assume collective responsibility for social well-being and a commit-
ment to equity. A feminist conceptualization of family support that en-
ables women to gain autonomy in their lives is urgently needed.
One inspiration for such visions emerges from recent feminist work in
the United States that sees the active support of the state as necessary for
enabling women to achieve individual autonomy. Maxine Eichner (2010)
argues for a model of the supportive state that
respects citizens’ autonomy by treating them as responsible citizens
who are accountable for their choices and relationships with others.
The liberal state, in this view, provides a scaffold onwhich citizens can
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solve them of the responsibility to plan carefully and budget wisely to
achieve their goals. Yet it maintains that the meeting of dependency
needs that these family members perform should be accomplished
within institutional structures that facilitate caretaking and human
development, and that it is the state’s responsibility to secure such
institutional structures. This approach recognizes the fact of depen-
dency, and that the ability of families to nurture their members does
not simply exist as a matter of fact, or spring up as a matter of spon-
taneous generation; instead, it is an achievement to be pursued jointly
by both citizens and the state. (Eichner 2010, 61)
Eichner’s perspective allows us to refute the assumption that any state
economic transfers to families represent problematic renewals of Soviet pa-
ternalism. The reconciliation she proposes between valuing liberty and care
work enables inquiry into how state support might be reconstructed to rec-
ognize the value of care work, foster the conditions that enable families to
pursue their own goals, and also promote gender equality within and be-
yond the domestic context. In Russia, this could entail complementing
economic support for child rearing or housing allowances for poor fami-
lies with policies that encourage private businesses to enable the balancing
of work and family responsibilities, and that combat the sexualization of
women and discrimination against women in the workplace. Given that
the vast majority of Russians endorse the notion that the state should as-
sist families in their caretaking work, such positions would hold pragmatic
value in legitimizing feminist agendas of gender equality while further
promoting the image of feminism as supportive of families.Conclusion
Inspired by Funk’s cautions about the dangers of mechanistically exporting
critiques of American liberalism to Eastern Europe, this article has consid-
ered the relevance of key liberal concepts of individual autonomy and a pri-
vate sphere for feminist interventions in Russian reproductive politics. I ar-
gue that defending women’s access to abortion can build on local notions
that women have a right to individual autonomy, but the neoliberal char-
acter of Russia’s commercialized surrogacy, by contrast, reveals the limits
of individual autonomy and the private sphere for promoting gendered jus-
tice. Feminist debates over maternity capital reveal the need for further dis-
cussion about how state-sponsored family support might create the condi-
tions for women to realize autonomy and avoid dependency, and the need
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ist, now neoliberal context. Funk charted a path toward such hybrid femi-
nist formations when she argued that Anglo-based feminists need to recon-
sider the value of liberal ideas for this region, even as she recognized that
these ideas cannot be imported wholesale: “For feminists to defend some
central liberal tenets does not mean an unbridled defense of all aspects of
liberalism past and present or of neoliberalism. Such a defense does not
exclude support for aspects of socialist thought, including social rights,
rights to employment, and abortion rights; nor does it preclude challenges
to neoliberal conceptions of the right to property” (Funk 2004, 717).
Indeed, this article has shown how determining the relevance of liberal
concepts requires examining the cultural meanings and historical, institu-
tional structuring of specific gendered inequalities to clarify the kinds of
concerns at stake for differently positioned Russian women. It also requires
understanding the political and organizational contexts of feminist activity
in Russia, a topic that I have not had space to address here. In brief, it is no-
table that Russian feminists and their supporters are just beginning tomake
public claims on reproductive issues;whilemany factors shape this situation,
it may partly be due to the fact that global configurations of feminist repro-
ductive politics have not been perceived as culturally relevant and politically
useful. As recent opposition reveals, Russian liberals are devising locally
meaningful strategies for defending abortion access, such as “fight abor-
tion, not women”; Western feminists may find their rhetorics instructive.
Certainly, amid Russia’s aggressively nationalist demographic politics,
lobbying on behalf of women’s interests in reproduction is dangerous.
Nationalists have labeled clinics providing abortions as “death factories,”
leaving them to defend their very existence (Baglikova 2012). I have ar-
gued that feminist strategies should aim at legitimizing contraceptive use
for ensuring timely, healthy pregnancies and highlighting the dangers that
restrictions can bring to women’s health and family life. On surrogacy pol-
itics, feminists may find themselves curiously sympathetic to the church’s
condemnation of surrogacy as commodifying and dehumanizing, while
further critiquing the gendered discrimination and stigmatization of orphans
that motivates infertile women’s interest in hiring surrogates. For both sur-
rogacy and family support politics, feminist interventions addressing the in-
equalities of neoliberalism may be more relevant for addressing women’s
multiple interests than emphasizing individual autonomy or a private sphere.
All three issues reveal the need for strategies that link feminism with both the
promotion of women’s autonomy and the strengthening of families and
other units of caregiving. Hybrid approaches melding liberal and ethics-
of-care concerns to establish feminism’s relevance for promoting Russian
590 y Rivkin-Fishwomen’s interests are most essential. Indeed, countering prevalent images
of feminism as opposed to families and men, and as threatening national vi-
tality (Antonov and Sorokin 2000), is a most urgent task for feminist en-
gagement in contemporary Russia.
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